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The section “Anti/Thesis” juxtaposes 
two rivaling positions on a controver-
sial issue related to the topic in focus. 
Due to the number of recent academic 
debates which address the role of the 
middle class in the Arab uprisings, this 
issue’s “Anti/Thesis” is dedicated to the 
controversy around the argument which 
casts the middle class as “motor of the 
Arab Spring.” While Benoît Challand ar-
gues that the constellation of actors in 
the uprisings of 2011 was too complex 
to be reduced to the middle class, Ra-
chid Ouaissa understands the middle 
class not as a driving force per se, but 
as the central group of supporters for a 
political force.
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Revolutions and revolts often result from 
an unfortunate and not always predictable 
chain of historical accidents. Established 
for more than 200 years, studies on revolu­
tions from various disciplines have de­
monstrated that, as a rule, revolutions are 
condemned to failure. The success or fail­
ure of these revolts and revolutions de­
pends on the stability and/or strength of 
intermittent alliances forged between the 
groups and social classes supporting the 
cause. In turn, these alliances depend 
upon whether the often conflicting inter­
ests of the involved actors collide, or 
whether some agreement can be found. It 
is in this interaction between the subjec­
tive desires of the actors and the objective 
structures they act in that the contradic­
tory role played by the middle classes be­
comes clear. The middle classes stand be­
tween two warring, irreconcilable strata or 
classes: on the one side there is the ruling 
class, striving to maintain its position of 
power and acquired privileges; on the 
other, there is the deprived and marginal­
ized subaltern seeking to bring about rad­
ical change or reform, using violence 
(Fanon) or subversive methods (Bayat). In 
such moments, the middle classes be­
come at once the object and the subject 
of revolutions. They are a subject because 
their desire for advancement makes them 
ready to seize opportunities, and fear of 
social decline amongst various segments 
within the middle classes turns them into 
the main actor of revolts; and they are an 
object because the outcome of the revolts 
depends on which political actors suc­
ceed in mobilizing the support of these 
middle classes, or at least broad sections 
thereof.
For instance, French colonialism in Algeria 
came to an end because, from the mid­
1950s, the middle classes sided with the 
“damned of the earth” and because de 
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to France and provide the middle classes 
with opportunities to advance by consoli­
dating industrialization (Plan de Constan­
tine) came too late and proved ineffective.
The conflict between “Rabia al-Adawiyya” 
and “al­Tahrir Square” is in fact a struggle 
to mobilize the disoriented Egyptian mid­
dle classes. President Morsi and the Mus­
lim Brotherhood have failed to offer a 
clear prospect for the middle classes and 
are thus now resorting to a mystical­reli­
gious project (“al­Adawiyya”). In contrast, 
the military guarantees protection, secu­
rity, and stability. The ongoing bloody con­
flict in Syria is to be interpreted along pre­
cisely the same lines: as a discursive battle 
between the regime and the rebel groups, 
each trying to gain the support of the mid­
dle classes.
The main argument of this paper is that 
the Arab middle classes are the principal 
agents and supporters of the protests, yet 
they do not possess the structural lever­
age necessary to force through radical re­
gime change. In contrast to the European 
middle classes that originated in con­
sumption­oriented industrialization, the 
Arab middle classes’ genesis is rent­based 
consumption, and they are thus more frag­
mented. Because of their socio­economi­
cal origin, the Arab middle classes con­
tinue to be susceptible to rent access and 
ideological discourses. 
It is not easy to determine which groups 
make up the “middle” of a society, and it 
is even more difficult to do so empirically 
(Gay; Burris; Savage et al.). The heteroge­
neity of the middle strata and its ambiva­
lent political role are well documented in 
literature. A distinction is drawn between 
“old” and “new” middle classes (Liaghat). 
While the old middle classes cover urban 
merchants and the self­employed, the 
new classes are made up of technological 
professions, and those employed in 
bureau cracy, education, and the service 
sector—designated as comprising a “pro­
fessional middle class” (Robinson). The 
political behavior of various segments of 
the middle classes, and thus with it op­
tions for forging alliances, depends on the 
economic substrate in which they are 
embed ded: “The new middle class seg­
ment is said to be sympathetic to the 
working class. The old middle class seg­
ment shows a more conservative tenden­
cy; and the marginal middle class seg­
ment expresses a desire for collective 
action” (Hsiao 5).
While this class is distinguished from the 
working class and the bourgeoisie, it is 
perceived, however, as being a class with­
out a character of its own; a class whose 
advancement is not directly the result of 
struggle between labor and capital, but 
whose members are to be seen more as 
the beneficiaries of this struggle. The ad­
vancement of this class depends primarily 
on regulatory mechanisms of the state or 
the ruling class. The transformation or the 
rise and crisis of the middle classes de­
pend on the relationship between the 
state and the market. The middle classes 
are characterized by a degree of “moral 
economy.” Their members insist on secu­
rity, justice and distribution, but they are 
also welfare­oriented. Ideologically, the 
middle classes are characterized as adher­
ing to socially conservative­religious 
values, are hardworking and economically 
prudent (Earle). This simultaneously mate­
rial and conservative­religious attitude 
makes them attractive for various actors of 
power, such as the military and religious 
groups.
Historically, Western middle classes are 
the result of intensified industrialization 
and consumer-oriented production. The 
middle classes became capable of acting 
on and negotiating their interests because 
the aristocracy was eager to increase its 
surplus. This attempt to increase surplus 
went hand in hand with an intensification 
of investment, which in turn depended 
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upon supporting measures promoting 
consumerism amongst broader strata of 
society. Such an intensifying of industrial­
ization and thus also consumption en­
tailed generating employment for broad­
er sections of society. This raised political 
demands and fostered the participatory 
will of these sections. In British history, this 
newly gained power of the middle classes 
led to the Reform Act of 1832.
Politically, it is often emphasized that the 
middle classes are of major importance 
for processes of democratic transforma­
tion (Pickel 138). But middle classes cannot 
be characterized as democratic per se, as 
they can also support extremist and fascist 
movements. In his article “Panic in the Mid­
dle Class,” Theodor Geiger showed how 
economic insecurity can lead to extremist 
behavior and attitudes amongst the mid­
dle classes. In 1930, wracked by crisis, the 
middle classes contributed significantly to 
Nazi electoral success. Lipset termed this 
“extremism of the center.” Numerous ex­
amples from Asia show that democratiza­
tion is not always the main goal of the 
middle classes. As long as a decent in­
come and prestige are secure, the middle 
classes are prepared to accept authoritar­
ian regimes. For the upwardly­mobile 
middle classes in Asia, a democratic de­
velopment is not the primary objective—
they are more interested in state­con­
trolled liberalization (Schwinn 213). In such 
cases, the desire to move upward and the 
fear of falling down the social ladder de­
termine the logic of action for the middle 
class.
It is certainly somewhat problematic to di­
rectly compare the middle classes in Arab 
or non­Western societies to those in 
Europe, and more in­depth empirical re­
search is needed. Nevertheless, I consider 
a comparison of the historical circum­
stances and structural conditions to be re­
vealing, particularly for identifying contra­
dictory political roles played by the middle 
classes.
Historically, the Arab middle classes have 
remained imprisoned in two specific struc­
tural conditions: colonialism and rentier 
structures. Since the mid­nineteenth cen­
tury in the Arab world, their opponent was 
not a ruling national aristocracy, but rather 
the colonial powers. These powers were 
solely concerned with exploiting re­
sources on their periphery, showing no 
interest in establishing capitalist structures 
and generating viable industrialization. 
From the outset, the middle classes 
emerging out of the few modernized in­
dustrial sectors that were fruitful for the 
colonial undertaking were marginalized 
politically. After World War I, these margin­
alized middle classes became the main 
pillar of nationalist movements and the 
anti­colonial struggle. With the end of co­
lonialism, the middle classes—or at least a 
segment thereof—assumed power. In this 
constellation, there was thus no struggle 
between the middle classes and a ruling 
class, for the ruling class was part of the 
middle classes. This marks an important 
difference between Western middle class­
es and those in post­colonial societies. 
The middle classes in industrialized 
Europe were forced to fight for their par­
ticipatory rights and democracy. This was 
only possible because they had gained a 
beneficial position for negotiating their in­
terests through intensification of profit-
driven industrialization. In contrast, post­
colonial and respectively Arab middle 
classes gained the political legitimacy to 
accumulate economic surplus through the 
role they played in the struggle for libera­
tion. Participation in economic surpluses 
through political positioning alone is 
known as a “rentier mentality.” Although 
the segment of the middle class in power 
developed into a separate “class” for itself, 
the broad middle class remained however 
a kind of organized clientele of the ruling 
class. Structurally, the middle classes in 
Europe have an economic origin, whereas 
in the Arab world their origin is political. 
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The middle classes in Europe are oriented 
toward profit, those in the Arab world on 
ensuring rent.
In the Arab world, an ideology establish­
ing a firm identity for the middle classes is 
particularly important because the mecha­
nisms enabling them to secure their posi­
tion by exploiting their property and as­
sets as a source of accumulation, 
generating greater income, are limited; 
mass consumerism and an economy driv­
en by property and investment are lack­
ing. In such societies—Egypt being a prime 
example—alignment to one camp or an­
other running along cultural­oriented 
agendas (nationalism versus Islamism) is 
of great importance to the middle classes.
The Arab middle classes have become a 
medium of grand ideologies. Up since the 
1930s, they were the support base for 
Arab socialism and nationalism, as well as 
political Islam. The crisis befalling the ren­
tier state and the forced infitah policies, 
entailing implementation of grave struc­
tural adjustments in the 1970s and 1980s, 
resulted in a split in the middle classes and 
a turn away from the state. With the state 
retreating from its welfare obligations, the 
middle classes were divided into a mar­
ginalized segment gravitating toward the 
lower classes, and a business­oriented 
segment supporting the incumbent 
regime while demanding further reform. 
While the former segment seeks to dis­
lodge the ruling regime, acting under the 
label of the religious discourse of justice 
and anticorruption, the latter is prepared 
to make a pact with reformers within the 
regime. This segment is hoping to share in 
the growth afforded by globalization 
under fair competition opportunities guar­
anteed by the state.
In reference to Egypt, Paul Amar distin­
guishes between a business­oriented 
middle class that however rejects global­
ization, and a frustrated middle class: 
[…] [A] coalition around nationalist 
businessmen in alliance with the milita­
ry—a military which also acts like nation­
alist middle­class businessmen. This 
group ejected the “crony globalisers” 
and “barons of privatisation” surround­
ing Gamal Mubarak. […] The Muslim 
Brothers represented frustrated, mar­
ginalized elements of the middle class. 
(18)
The Arab Spring is the result of accumu­
lated frustration from these two segments, 
with their varying demands and expecta­
tions. The regimes were neither willing to 
reform—and so satisfy the demands of the 
business­oriented classes—nor were they 
able to meet the demands of the margin­
alized. The motto of the revolts—‘aish, kara-
ma, adala ljtima’iyya (“bread, dignity, and 
social justice”)—expresses the minimal 
consensus between the revolting seg­
ments of the middle class. For the low seg­
ment, ‘aish is the most important demand; 
for the business segment, the main con­
cern is to establish karama and adala 
Ijtima’iyya.
The outcome of the Arab revolts ultimate­
ly testifies to just how difficult it is to unify 
the divergent voices and demands into a 
joint political message, and how broad 
sections of the middle classes are willing 
to find a consensus among factions within 
the regime, far removed from any demand 
for democracy. In this way, the middle 
classes are contributing to reconfiguration 
of the regime.
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